Random Procrastination thoughts at 2PM: Tata et al and infrastructure

Fascinating. $500 billion in private investments in infrastructure in India in the next 3 years.

And in China – a coal power plant goes up every two weeks.

This sort of thing creates all sorts of opportunities, all sorts of problems, and all sorts of challenges. I like what this Bangladeshi is doing about some of them.

Random procrastination thoughts at 2 AM: 2K car edition

What will the $2000 Tata car mean for traffic jams in Dhaka?

Some possibilities:

1. The traffic jams will get better - rickshaws and autorickshaws will be crowded out as more people who used to use them will now be able to afford the $2k car (or perhaps, $2k taxis)…

2. The traffic jams will get worse. Autorickshaws and rickshaws will not be driven out of the market, but their fares will drop because of pressure from $2k taxis and cars.

I think 2 is more likely. Autorickshaw drivers will likely be less badly affected as they might be able to jump across to driving the $2k car (which will cost a little bit more than the monopolistically-priced CNG autorickshaw) But rickshaw-pullers will see their already meagre earnings drop. This really is (or should be) the bigger issue, than the worry about traffic jams…

Best quote I read all week: Land of the Free edition

This piece in the BBC was just hilarious, though at the end of the day a sad commentary on things in Pakistan (and very reminiscent of things in Bangladesh). Best quote:

The other day, some of the top army generals finished a hard day’s work at a conference in Islamabad and decided they’d earned a bit of entertainment.

Buoyed by their own spontaneity, they had that evening’s sold-out performance of the musical Bombay Dreams cancelled for ticket-paying patrons, and enjoyed an exclusive viewing of Pakistani girls dancing to Indian music director AR Rehman’s tunes.

That’s freedom! Freedom to steal the show, in this case.

[Bonus: Responding an earlier edition of the Best Line of the week series, Fugstar   (whose blog is an interesting read) complained about the inadequacy of comparing Imam Bukhari to Thomas Aquinas. Good point, Fugstar, but it might be a little off-target. My response:

You would be right, Fugstar, if the comparison was about functions. Then Mr. Bukhari - the collector of ahadith - would not be like Mr. Aquinas. But the comparison was really more about their prominent positions in their respective canons. AmalA might be comparing apples to bananas - but at least she’s comparing fruits instead of comparing bananas to creepy crawly critters the way the NYTimes article was…

Yes, we do read your comments, and with great interest too. Keep 'em coming!]

 [OK back to work, or something like it....]

Divide & Rule

In the 1980’s, proceeds from “illegal” arms sales to the Iranians, which was later found to be ransom payment in exchange for American hostages, were channeled to a right- wing guerilla insurgency against a left leaning Nicaraguan government known as the Contras. After failed attempts at covering up the debacle, which included among other things- a Presidential address by the then President Ronald Reagan, which he later reneged, the truth revealed itself. The international scandal that ensued would leave the Reagan administration struggling to find scapegoats who could be distanced from the office of the President. The efforts convinced few, and abruptly ended many careers, although many later returned to public life. This would go on to be known as the Iran- Contra Affair, etched into history as one of America’s biggest foreign policy misjudgments. And in the end, she ended up backing human rights violations as leftist conspiracies, in the interest of bringing wide spread reform to Nicaragua. That, never happened.

Also, in the 1980’s, soon after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, first the Carter administration and later the Reagan administration, would embark on a massive support and training campaign for the Afghan freedom fighters, or the “mujahideen”. In addition to all concerned government agencies, several think tanks, aid organizations, and other republican outfits would cough up ample resources to rally support for these “mujahideen”, to liberate the Republic of communist forces, and establish a strategic presence in the region. The largely Arab CIA trained mercenary forces who fought alongside the Taliban during this time, given their differences, would later go on to build their own ghettos and communities and find safe haven in war-torn Afghanistan. This band of brothers then came to call themselves “Al- Qaeda”. Years later, 9/11 happened. In the end, we ended up funding and training extremist elements, in the interest of bringing wide spread reform to Afghanistan. That, never happened.

To be fair, this notion of supporting dissenting elements to catalyze a change an external force desires (an loose version of “Divide & Rule”) however, has had it’s successes. The concept met with some of it’s most prominent successes during the colonial era, and found few documented defeats (although colonial powers were rarely known to admit defea, let alone document them!). In modern times too this game of russian roulette has found limited success, often at inexplicable and unpredictable costs (read: Iraqi Provisional Authority; jury’s still out on that, yes?).

In recent weeks, reports have emerged that several elements within the CA’s team, with cautious distance from the CA himself, have been using their clout to bargain with mid-level leaders and dissenting elements who have of late been side-lined in party politics, on both sides of the isle. These leaders in turn have been leveraging their new found intimacy with the SOE government to drum up support to introduce drastic leadership changes in both parties. That, was the carrot. What’s the stick? Well, them threatening to leave the party. And given the humble rise of the LDP and Prof Yunus floating political ambitions, my friend, they have options. This strategic offensive however, is almost as ill conceived and far worse executed, as the government’s minus 2 scheme. With civil society and intelligentsia riding it’s coat tails, the SOE government seems to increasingly find itself on the defensive on issues like transparency and accountability; while it still continues to exercise it’s ambiguous and sweeping emergency powers.

Today, Bangladesh and it’s citizens are in a much better shape. A corrupt system of endemic proportions, which had until now remained unchallenged and accepted as a reality of life in Bangladesh, is now being taken to task. The country finds itself basking in an air of confidence, reinitiated in the belief that corruption can actually be curtailed (notwithstanding the sensationalism of finding relief goods in ministerial homes of course). The government is engaging culprits at every level best it can, and taking the time to structure viable legal cases against them. Price of essentials, thanks to the BDR, is on the dive, and every week seems to bring news of another corrupt politician being sued by the ACC. And if that isn’t enough, the Tigers beat India and South Africa (the CA of course, had little to do with that). Indeed, I can’t quite recall the last time it felt so good to see a SOE. Much of the credit goes to the CA and his team (not all his team- no, not all). But now, Bangladesh must gradually make the transition from relatively successful crisis management , to institution building and long term sustainable progress under a democracy.

The inherent nature of politics dictates the tacit reality of constant power plays, miscommunication and infighting. Add to that the complexity of party leaders (who might I add have ruled for much of the country’s existence) put to unexplained exile, still others imprisoned, and the legitimacy of an unelected government dangerously swinging in the scales, and you see the fragile state of the Bangladeshi political landscape.

Mind you, by no stretch of the imagination, am I defending our rogue leaders. Much of my sentiments are echoed in Shamshir’s post below. None of the party high-ups have even hinted at the prospect of admitting to mistakes, but repeatedly manage to divert the discussion towards “constant reform” that they’ve been engaging in all along (apparently the rest of us missed the memo); without ever acknowledging the past. In many cases, the leadership on both sides of the isle seem more resolved in their belligerence and self- righteousness.

So on the one hand, there is probably some truth to the fact that, short- term to get the culprits off the streets, in a system of lawlessness, extra judicial steps are an unfortunate reality. But on the other, you wonder of the precedents these initiatives are setting. And we really don’t unelected governments issuing any more licenses of sweeping power, the elected governments of past have already mastered that art. And this is where the government seems to be suffering from chronic schizophrenia.

On the one hand, it seeks to create long term policy reform and institutions that long outlive it’s authors and current political leaderships, but on the other it seems to be repeatedly finding itself responding with knee jerk reactions and initiatives which only seem beneficial in the short- term. And while these short term victories are necessary in turn-around schemes (my consulting skills coming into play), it is increasingly beginning to take on an air of permanence. Frankly, I am either ignorant to the circumstances on the ground, or am expecting too much from a bad situation; either way the CA’s lack of foresight of late has astonished me.

Although, without naming names, I would like to squarely lay blame on the drooping shoulders of a rather stocky advisor, who in my opinion, has the collective intelligence of a gardening tool. With both major political parties in a state of disarray, and mass pressure for reform, the government is ideally positioned to call for widespread political reform in both parties. Instead, in its’ bid to do away with dynastic politics, the government has decided to promote other individuals in it’s efforts for political reform.

Firstly, there is a reason why these particular leaders are “mid-level” or “marginalized”. And if by giving them legitimacy in this state of emergency, we hope for long term sustainable effects, then we’re headed for sure disappointment, as Maulana Rumi said “this too shall pass”. In a nation, where we constantly find our institutions failing us, and the personality of the individuals almost always overshadowing the offices they bear, why wouldn’t we rather go for formalizing of structures that can carry on long after the leaders of today? The ruling party, and the opposition party, are constitutional institutions of the republic, serving at the pleasure of the republic. The people will eventually rally behind the party’s long-standing leadership, even if they were “misled” for a few brief moments. But let’s say hypothetically- this did work, what prevents our newly minted leaders from starting their own dynasties?

Secondly, if it is reform we seek, why wouldn’t we engage the existing leadership, which already has the legitimacy and clout to implement the initiatives in a time sensitive manner? These are daunting challenges; and bans on indoor politics, power vacuums within the parties, imprisoned party brass etc. won’t make it easier. On the other hand, this does mean that the pressure’s on, conditions propitious, and reform agendas ripe for the picking.

We must actively pursue the rank and file of both parties, decentralize power, and institute checks and balances at every level of partisan politics. For once, let’s have an election based on the issues, and distinctive policies that deal with those issues. Let’s bring the institution of AL or the institution of BNP, LDP, to the forefront.

Why would the parties oblige? Well, hopefully because they realize that if they wish their parties and legacies to live on, they will need to let other leaders carry on after them, and also because, the CA said so! We could also conveniently remind them, that the 7^th infantry battalion works for him.

And why would the CA be interested? Because a good reformer not only dismantles the system of corruption, but puts in place a reliable system of governance that evolves those reforms into institutional policies. In the absence of these long term initiatives, our country will remain a nation where government officials pathologically abuse their powers, our heightened fear of the ACC will slowly wane, government agencies and it’s officials will seep back into unbridled corruption, national progress will remain an abstract concept; and worst of all, the renewed faith of our citizens will become a distant memory.

Exile III

I do have some more thoughts on my Exile II post, but since I am barely keeping my head above water with exams, I am going to have to keep it short in responding to Mash and Shaijad’s insightful comments . Again, my apologies for this being utterly disjointed, vague and perhaps vapid:

1.  I think I might have been misunderstood – and that’s my own fault. My point with #2 in the Exile II post was not to defend what the SOE government has been doing. This is why I started my post with talking about due process in #1. The rule of law is obviously preferable to me. My point, to clarify, was this: even if exile is the option that the SOE government wants to take, there is a way of doing it that would be consistent with the rule of law.  This was the plea bargain option. The plea bargain option was not a description of what the government IS doing, but an idea for what they SHOULD HAVE BEEN if they cared (or even thought) about maintaining a modicum of transparency and accountability.

2. Instead of course, we agree, the SOE authorities decided to resort to naked unbridled power. Laying aside the morality of doing so (and I do think it is wrong to do so), the problem with naked unbridled power is that if you don’t have a lot of it, you overshoot. This is the fact that BNP failed to see in its machinations in its last term. And the lesson eluded the SOE government too, as we are seeing with the minus-2 option falling apart (as it seems to right now…) The SOE government overshot – as it was bound to do some time with its ad hoc decision-making that relied less upon process and legality and more upon strength and some claim of relative moral legitimacy.

The problem with relying on strength of course is that if there’s someone stronger, and strenght is all you’re depending on – you’re in trouble. The problem with relying on relative moral legitimacy is you have to live up to it. Double-talking advisors don’t help.

3. Think about what would have happened if the SOE government had gone through due process before exiling Khaleda Zia – for example by making her sign onto a plea bargain accompanied by a clear unambiguous statement from the government explaining why they were doing what they were doing. The Saudis would definitely not be able to humiliate them/make look plain silly by asking for Khaleda Zia to come to the embassy for a visa interview.  And I’m thinking that a good segment of the population would point to the plea bargain and say, “They’re not bundling her away unfairly. She’s admitted to things, and because of the (objectively verifiable) reasons that the government is giving, it makes sense for her to be sent away. They’re being straight with us.” Instead we got double-speak, and naturally disillusionment.  

I realize that a plea bargain such as this would not be unproblematic. How did they arrive at it? What kind of back-room negotiations took place? Why not just go through the courts instead? &c.  And may be there are no set answers to these, but at least the SOE should try.

I guess my point then – and this is where I agree with Shaijad (and I guess where Mash is coming from) – transparency and accountability are of paramount importance. And a government like the SOE government – suspect as it is because of its unelectedness – can only maintain legitimacy if it tries to be as transparent and accountable as possible. And the only way to do it is to keep coming back to the public with objectively verifiable statements. None of this, “Trust us” business. We’ve seen this all before.

4. The SOE government clearly does not get it. I agree with Mash that as long as fundamental rights remain in abeyance - anything they do is suspect. What we have to tell anyone who claims to want to do good and fix things still remain, “Why should we believe you? Show us your bona fides. Show us things that we can check your intentions against. Objectively.”

5. But the same skepticism should govern our reaction to anyone else claiming the helm as well – be it Khaleda Zia, Sheikh Hasina, or Poltu bhai who lives down the goli.  Yes, nothing has changed since 1/11 – definitely not the questions we should be asking of those who would lead us.

6. Nothing that I have seen in the public statements of either Sheikh Hasina or Khaleda Zia since 1/11 suggest that they’ve really learnt anything from the experience in the last 3 months. What indication do we have that we are not to see a repeat of the last 15 years if elections were to be held 6/12/18 months from now and they were to return to power? What have we seen of soul-searching self-reflection? What have we seen of remorse and the possibility of redemption? In fact, it would be safe to say that every indication we have received from the netris suggests that things will actually be worse if they return. In their statements is the same sense of entitlement, the same assumption of infallibility. 

This does not absolve the SOE government of its failures to meet the standards of accountability and transparency. (And intelligence! Is intelligence too much to ask for? You hear some of the statements of certain advisors made in the last few days and you wonder how they ever got to where they did…) Our standards are not, must not be, lower. And yes, we have very little that demonstrates that the SOE government cares about either accountability and transparency – which are its only lifelines to legitimacy.

Our true hope lies in ideas and institutions – not parties, personalities or platitudes. This is as it always was – but our young nation has failed to recognize this at every critical juncture in its history. There’s enough blame to go around.

Exiled II

So the exiling of Khaleda Zia seems to be on its way. And it is likely that Sheikh Hasina will be unable to return. The minus-2 plan seems just about near to completion. This is going to have to be a quick, disjointed post – cause I have finals right now. [But Shamshir, you say, your posts are always disjointed! True, true. I hear you.]

1. I have cautioned about the need for due process – even as far back as the beginning of the SOE government, when a lot of people were unreservedly cheering their every move under the doctrine of necessity [see the Daily Star from that time]. I could harp on it again – but that would be no fun, and I would be adding nothing new to the discussion. I have to say, though, that it’s good to see more people talking about due process. Whatever the next few days/months/years hold for us, these conversations are important to have in our communities. It suffices to say that I suspect many of the people shedding tears for due process would not be so averse to the way things are happening had the results not been so adverse to their political preferences. But people can hopefully see beyond that. The bigger proplem may be elsewhere. Note that due process is an empty phrase without an understanding of what it means, and why it should mean what it does. After all, it is possible that fair-weather pundits (and adda-fiers such as myself) think that only that much process is due as we would like there to be…  Our considerations of due process require a deeper and broader analysis that I have seen. Perhaps I will get a chance to write on this more extensively this summer.

2. There’s a view that’s out there that says that because these politicians committed crimes, they have to be tried. I agree -in ideal moral circumstance they would have to be tried, and punishment received would be well-deserved in many well-documented cases. But that being said, I am not so sure that given the circumstances, exile is really such a bad option. It’s a low-cost option. On the one hand it avoids bloodshed. On the other, the uncertainties of a trial whose results could not be anything but political.  This last point probably requires some elaboration. How could they avoid politicizing the trial process? The judges have leanings. May be then, they should change the judges, you say - but how could that be achieved without laying the government open to charges of politicizing the trial by selecting their own judges? Besides, when Barrister XYZ goes up against some government prosecutor, I know who my money is going to be on… The system is totally messed up. It’s like OJ Simpson’s lawyers going up against the LA district attorney.

Prosecutors in the US face this kind of issue all the time. There’s costs to going to the system. One solution to the dilemma - and it has its critics, for very good reasons – is allowing prosecutors to cut plea bargains. If the SOE planners really cared deeply about the rule of law, and they were clever about things (and there the jury still is out on both questions, though we do have strong indications…) that’s what they’d do. They’d structure exile as a plea bargain: “You are exiled – it’s the punishment that the state and you have agreed upon for your admitted involvement in this, this and this. In return for your admission – and recognizing the constraints of our system – we’ve mutually agreed upon exile as punishment.” What you are getting out of it is two things. One, admission  of guilt - and admission of guilt that’s worth a lot more than half of the stuff that comes out of confessions in remand, which really is a euphemism for torture. And you more importantly, at least you are getting at least a semblance of transparency.  They way things stand right now, we can speculate why the SOE government is doing things the way that they are. But the SOE government was clear why it was coming in in the first place – because the system had been thrown so out of whack that an intervention was necessary and proper. But if the justification is really what it is, then it should be no problem for the SOE to say that it would have liked a trial, but a trial is impossible in the out-of-whack system (note the distinction here – the justification is not the circumstances, but the system itself which was the raison d’etre of the SOE government in the first place), and thus the most legal, most transparent way, most efficacious means available to them is a plea-bargain that involves exile. The SOE must realize that it can only maintain trust and a semblance of legitimacy when the populace feels that there’s some objective standard – rather than subjective ad hoc claims – that they can hold the SOE government accountable to.

3. I see people have pointed out that Mannan Bhuiyan and others in the BNP leadership are not making enough noise about the exile given what they owe to the party. It seems to me that they’re damned if they do, damned if they don’t.

4. It will be interesting to see what Sheikh Hasina does in the next few days. The question that she should be asking herself really is “What would my father do now?” Even Bangabandhu’s worst detractors and his assassins could never deny his personal fearlessness. I think Bangabandhu, faced with similar circumstances, would walk back to Bangladesh if necessary. But Bangabandhu could – even in the ebb of his popularity – always count on people rising up and sacrificing themselves to receive him if he did. Can Sheikh Hasina count on the same kind of support, and the same kind of moral authority?

Yes, that will do it…

Apparently, thinking that what you are doing is good exercise is exercise in itself, and has a positive effect on health. Exercise apparently has a placebo effect… [Hat tip: Marginal revolution]

Someone please convince me that sitting around all day and adda-fying is good exercise.